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Contact history is crucial during an infectious disease outbreak and vital when seeking to understand and predict the spread of
infectious diseases in human populations. -e transmission connectivity networks of people infected with highly contagious
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) in Saudi Arabia were assessed to identify super-spreading events
among the infected patients between 2012 and 2016. Of the 1379 MERS cases recorded during the study period, 321 (23.3%) cases
were linked to hospital infection, out of which 203 (14.7%) cases occurred among healthcare workers. -ere were 1113 isolated
cases while the number of recorded contacts per MERS patient is between 1 (n � 210) and 17 (n � 1), with a mean of 0.27
(SD� 0.76). Five super-important nodes were identified based on their high number of connected contacts worthy of priori-
tization (at least degree of 5). -e number of secondary cases in each SSE varies (range, 5–17). -e eigenvector centrality was
significantly (p< 0.05) associated with place of exposure, with hospitals having on average significantly higher eigenvector
centrality than other places of exposure. Results suggested that being a healthcare worker has a higher eigenvector centrality score
on average than being nonhealthcare workers. Pathogenic droplets are easily transmitted within a confined area of hospitals;
therefore, control measures should be put in place to curtail the number of hospital visitors and movements of nonessential staff
within the healthcare facility with MERS cases.
1. Introduction
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV)
is a contagious respiratory pathogen that is contracted via
close contact with infected individuals. Interactions among
individuals can aid super-spreading of infectious diseases in
humans or animals, and it is usually highest among in-
dividuals in close proximity with one another. MERS-CoV
was first reported in a 60-year-old man in Bisha area of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2012 [1]. It has now spread across
27 countries in 4 continents. -e most index case-patients
have either resided in or have travelled to areas neighbouring
the Arabian Peninsula [2]. From the intermittent trans-
mission that had occurred in animal-to-human [1, 3], many
human-to-human cases have also been documented within
families and healthcare facilities [3–7].
During an infectious disease outbreak such as MERS-
CoV (or MERS for short), the transmission usually forms
networks of infected individuals (cluster of outbreaks)
probably because of the way the virus crosses from one
infected individual to another susceptible individual. In
other words, the source of infection may be the direct or
indirect connection [8]. In network analysis, the aim is to
identify the most crucial infected patients (also called
nodes), who are important in the super-spreading and to use
the location of the node in the network to predict which
patients (nodes) are likely to be infected [9].-ese important
patients are influential in that they infect disproportionately
large numbers of secondary contacts [10, 11].
Super-spreading events (SSEs) are as a result of in-
dividuals (agents of SSE) harbouring the virus who infect
disproportionately more secondary contacts, as compared to
most others [7, 10, 11]. -erefore, an SSE consists of a large
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cluster of infection in which some individuals infect many
more other individuals, thereby acting as agents for an SSE.
In this study, super-spreading was defined as having at least
five contacts. SSEs have been documented in other infectious
disease outbreaks such as SARS in Beijing 2003 [12] and
more recently Ebola in West Africa, 2014–2015 [13, 14], and
MER-CoV in South Korea, 2015 [10].
-e knowledge of people’s connectivity network is very
crucial in the spread of infectious diseases transmitted via
pathogenic droplets such as respiratory infection, MERS,
and Ebola. As in the case of MERS, occasional larger cluster
sizes should not be unexpected, such as the outbreak in
South Korea [7]. Although there have been variations in the
size of human-human transmission of MERS, its high
variability and heterogeneity in the transmission potential
have been underscored [15, 16].
Over the years, researchers have been exploring how the
knowledge of network structures could influence public
health measures. For example, network analysis based on
connectivity centrality was used to identify high-risk people
for targeted vaccination in an effort to contain the spread of
infectious disease [17]. Network analysis was used to in-
vestigate whether the density of the network contacts of
persons infected by Mycobacterium tuberculosis was more
likely to be tested positive for tuberculosis (TB) compared to
the occurrence of TB clusters detected through network
connections with clusters detected by molecular genotyping
[18]. Similarly, the effect of protein-protein interactions
within the host-pathogen interactome was explored via
network analysis on pathogen fitness during infection [19].
-e focus of this study was to map and measure re-
lationships and flows between people infected with MERS
and to investigate the structure of MERS transmission with
the help of network and graphs. Patient’s interactions and
links were obtained through contact tracing within 14 days
prior to the onset of the disease. -e structure of network
connectivity will assist in identifying the most influential
contacts, while network centrality metrics were used to
investigate the contribution and characteristics of the agents
of super-spreading to the infection and spread of MERS.
And lastly, the role played by patient’s attributes (node
property) was investigated as an epidemic amplifier or at-
tenuator via hypotheses testing.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Data Sources. -is study is based on case-by-case list of
clinical-confirmed MERS cases provided by Dr. Rambaut
[20]. -e focus is on the 1379 MERS cases reported in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between June 2012 and September
2016. -e variables considered in this study were age,
gender, patient type (whether the patient is a healthcare
worker (HCW) or nonhealthcare worker), health outcome
(dead or alive) as at the last day of follow-up, patient
comorbidity status, types of exposure to known risk factors
(animal contact and camel contact indirectly or directly or
through consumption of camel products), and place of
infection (classified as hospital, community, and household/
family). -e data set was cross validated with information
from WHO disease outbreak news and Saudi Arabia MOH
MERS command and control website.
2.2. Study Area. -e Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is the
main part of the peninsula bounded by the Red Sea on the
west, Gulf of Aden on the south, Gulf of Oman on the south
east, and Arabian Gulf on the east. -e KSA measures about
2,150,000 square kilometres and shares its border with
several countries, such as Jordan and Iraq in the north,
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates in the
east, and Oman and Yemen in the south. -e country is
situated on latitude 15.66–32.15 and longitude 34.5–55.67
(Figure 1). -e KSA is divided into 13 regions (Manatiq,
administrative level 1) and 118 governorates (Muhafazat,
administrative level 2).-eWorld Bank as of 2014 estimated
its population to be 30.89 million [21].
2.3. Definitions, Contact Tracing, and Sociodemographic
Variables. MERS patients were clinically confirmed via real-
time RNA-positive strand virus using reverse transcription
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) with a positive PCR on
at least two specific genomic targets, upstream E protein
(upE) and ORF1a, or a single positive target (upE) with
sequencing of a second target RdRpSeq assay or N gene
(NSeq assay) [6, 22]. Patients’ contact investigation was
conducted by hospital officials by tracing patient’s history of
exposure to other known risk factors such as contact with
other laboratory-confirmed MERS cases, animal/camel
contact, or visiting other places known to be linked to
MERS cases 14 days prior to the onset of symptoms. An
animal contact patient implies a patient with historical
contact with animals, while camel contact patients were
those who work in a camel market or have history of contact
with camels, or consumed camel products in 14 days prior to
the onset of symptoms.
A healthcare worker is anyone who works in a healthcare
facility (all personnel, such as doctors, nurses, laboratory
staff, securities, and receptionists). A patient is said to have
comorbidity if he or she has coexisting chronic diseases or
medical conditions or has been admitted to the hospital due
to unrelated medical conditions. Place of exposure is clas-
sified as (a) hospital infection if the infection occurred in
a hospital, for example, a healthcare worker/hospital
visitor/outpatient contracting the disease in a healthcare
facilities, (b) family infection if the infection was through
a family member or within the household, or (c) community
infection if the infection is contracted outside the hospital or
household, such as in schools, workplace, hajj tents, etc.
2.4. Statistical Analysis. Descriptive analysis was conducted
on some sociodemographic variables presented as mean and
standard deviation for age and frequencies and percentages
for other categorical variables. Prevalence of MERS disease
across communities, household, and hospitals was tested via
the chi-square statistic for categorical variables while the t-test
was used for continuous variables (Table 1).
-e units of network analysis in this study are the nodes
representing individuals infected with MERS within
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families, hospitals, or communities which are connected via
edges. 
e outbreak network visualization and network
analyses were conducted in R package “igraph” [23] and
UCINET 6.0 Version 1.00 [24].We used centrality metrics to
measure the structural importance of patients (nodes) in
a network. 
e node “degree centrality” was used to reveal
the most active nodes in the network and how well a node is
connected with its neighbours—a node degree is the number
of edge incidents on a node. 
e “betweenness centrality”
was used to measure how many pairs of nodes a node can be
connected to through a shortest path, while the “closeness
centrality” was used to measure how contagious an infected
patient (a node) is to others [9, 17, 24, 25]. Similarly, “2-reach
centrality” was used to explore the proportion of nodes that
can reach a given node in 2 steps or less while “eigen-
vector centrality” was used to measure the importance of
a node depending on the importance of its neighbours.
Figures 2(a)–2(d) provide an illustration of dierent network
centrality metrics.
Finally, the eects of patient’s attributes on their position
in a network (measured by network centrality metrics) were
investigated, and the relationship between two (or more)
network centrality metrics was explored. We used permu-
tation tests in UCINET 6.0 Version 1.00 [24] to test spe-
cically the following aspects: (1) whether more central
patients are HCWs or not, (2) whether more central
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Figure 1: Map showing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and surrounding countries.
Table 1: Summary of sociodemographic and contact characteristics of MERS-CoV cases in the top 3 infected regions in the KSA during the
study period.
Variable Ar Riyad (n  645) Makkah (n  335) Ash Sharqiyah (n  174) Overall (n  1379) p value
Mean agea (SD) 52.73 (19.06) 48.39 (20.01) 61.0 (8.04) 51.7 (18.52) 0.0239
Sexb
Male 373 (57.83%) 226 (67.46%) 125 (71.84%) 901 (65.3%) <0.0001
Female 263 (40.78%) 100 (29.85%) 49 (28.16%) 460 (33.4%)
Healthcare workerc 87 (13.49%) 60 (17.91%) 23 (13.22%) 203 (14.7%) <0.0001
Comorbidityd 428 (66.4%) 124 (37.0%) 124 (71.13%) 819 (59.4%) 0.2410
Fatal 199 (30.85%) 92 (27.46%) 79 (45.40%) 466 (33.79%) <0.0001
Place of exposuree
Community linked 48 (7.44%) 6 (1.79%) 17 (9.77%) 81 (5.9%) <0.0001
Other contacts 66 (10.23%) 94 (28.06%) 27 (15.52%) 224 (16.2%)
Hospital linked 209 (32.40%) 23 (6.87%) 45 (25.86%) 321 (23.3%)
Index 0 0 0 2 (0.2%)
Animal linkedf 54 (8.37%) 30 (8.96%) 36 (20.69%) 162 (11.74%) <0.0001
Camel linkedg 48 (7.44%) 25 (7.46%) 33 (18.97%) 145 (10.51%) <0.0001
Note. aAge: 5 (0.4%) cases missing age value. bSex: 18 (1.3%) cases of unknown gender. cHealthcare worker: 516 (37.4%) unknown or unclassied healthcare
worker status. dComorbidity: 338 (24.5%), unknown or unclassied comorbidity status. eContact history: 750 (54.4%) unknown source/place of exposure.
fAnimal contact: 838 (60.8%) unknown animal contact history. gCamel contact: 867 (62.9%) unknown camel contact history.
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infections happened in the hospital or community, and
(3) how much of the variation in patient’s betweenness
centrality, for example, can be explained by their out-degree,
for example.
3. Results
3.1. Descriptive Summaries. During the study period, 1379
MERS cases were recorded in the KSA, most cases occurred
in Ar Riyad (46.7%) and Makkah (24.3%). 
e overall crude
fatality rate (CFR) is 33.79% (466 fatalities in 1379 cases)
(Table 1). 
ere were more cases among males (901, 65.3%)
than females (460, 33.4%). 
e mean age of infected MERS
patients was 51.7 years, 82% of all cases occurred in people
between the ages 25 and 74 years. High proportions ofMERS
cases were observed amongmale patients aged 30 years to 74
years (76% of the male cases) and female patients aged 25
years to 74 years (85% of the female cases) (Table 1 and
Figure 3).
MERS fatality increases with age, 11% of the infection
occurred in older males aged 55–59 years and more fatal in
older men (above 50 years). Similarly, 85% of fatality in
females occurred in women above 50 years. A high pro-
portion (about 79%) of patients had some kind of prior
medical condition (comorbidity). 
e number of patients
with comorbidity varied slightly across the regions. 
ere
was higher fatal outcome in patients with comorbidity than
patients without any comorbidity. About 47% of those with
some kind of medical condition died of the disease com-
pared to only 17% of patients without medical condition.

e results showed that about half of cases (629 (45.6%))
were linked to at least one place of exposure where 321
(23.3%) of them were linked to hospital outbreaks (Table 1).

ere were 750 (54.4%) cases, whose contact history of
infection was unknown. Of the 321 cases linked to hospital
outbreaks, more than one-third (n  119) occurred among
healthcare workers, indicating that about 58.7% of all cases
involving healthcare workers happened in the hospital (data
not shown in Table 1).
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Figure 2: Illustration of (a) degree-, (b) betweenness-, (c) closeness-, and (d) eigenvector-centrality metrics for sample MERS infection
network. Each of the patient number represents a node connected by links called edges. 
e square nodes represent males while the circle
nodes represent females. Grey represents healthcare workers and dark colours are nonhealthcare workers while white is unknown.
e node
sizes indicate the centrality values in Table 2.
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3.2. Networks Visualization and Centrality Metrics for the
MERS Data. 
e contact structure of MERS cases in the
KSA between June 2012 and September 2016 is displayed in
Figure 4. Isolated nodes (n  1113 (80.7%)) with degree of
zero are not shown in the gure. 
ere were 1113 isolated
cases while the number of recorded contacts per MERS
patient is between 1 (n  210) and 17 (n  1), with a mean of
0.27 (SD 0.76). 
ere were a total of 266 connections—110
primary cases and 156 secondary cases. 
e majority of the
rst line secondary cases did not produce any further sec-
ondary cases of their own. 
e largest cluster has a wheel-
and-spoke conguration in which patient number 1664 is in
the centre and linked to 17 other secondary cases (6.4% of
the total cases in the network) (Figure 4). 
e results showed
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Figure 3: Distribution of MERS-CoV infection in males and females among dierent age structures in the KSA.
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Figure 4: Network contact structure for the spread of MERS-CoV infection in the KSA between 2012 and 2016 showing (a) whether an
individual is a healthcare worker or not and (b) individual’s comorbidity status. Males are represented by squares while females are
represented by circles. Nodes represent all tagged individuals. Isolated cases (nodes of degree zero) are not shown.
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that most of the outbreaks occurred in the hospital (in-
dicated by dark line in Figure 4) and that most of the infected
patients were nonhealthcare workers with comorbidity
(indicated by green nodes in Figure 4).
Table 2 presents the measures of network centrality
estimates for the 10 most important nodes (subsequently
called patients) selected by each networkmetric. A total of 31
nodes worthy of prioritization were selected based on these
network metrics (Table 2). It was revealed that 9 out of 31
(29%) of the cases are healthcare workers and 8 (25.8%) cases
had some kind of comorbidity. About half of the prioritized
nodes (n � 15 (48.4%)) occurred in hospital settings while 7
(22.6%) cases were fatal.
Based on degree centrality metrics, the top five most
important cases were identified based on at least five sec-
ondary cases, indicating their high number of connected
contacts worthy of prioritization (Table 2). -e number of
secondary cases in each SSE varies slightly (range, 5–17).
Closeness and 2-Reach network metrics ranked the same
patients (1664, 1672, 1673, 1674, 1681, 1682, 1683, 1684,
1685, and 1686) among the top 10 cases worthy of priori-
tization while the eigenvector metrics list was also very
similar. -e betweenness scores, which indicate the number
of other nodes infected by the given node, indicated that
patient 1522, 1521, 897, 895, and 910 had the top 5 highest
betweenness score of a range of 6 to 9.
Among the important cases according to degree cen-
trality, four resulted in fatality. Patient 1664 was favoured
(based on degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector
network centrality metrics) as the most important in the
transmission network by having the highest number of
secondary cases. However, the cases selected using be-
tweenness centrality were slightly different from other
metrics with patient 1522 topping the list. -e degree and
betweenness centrality estimates are depicted in Figures 5(a)
and 5(b), respectively.-e larger node area shows the level of
worthiness of prioritization.
3.3. Patients Attributes and Network Centrality. When net-
work centrality metrics were used to investigate the asso-
ciation between patient’s attributes and patient’s position in
a network, only eigenvector centrality was significantly as-
sociated with two patient’s attributes. -e eigenvector
centrality was significantly (p< 0.05) associated with place
of exposure, with hospital infection having on average
significantly higher eigenvector centrality than other places
of exposure. Similarly, being a healthcare worker was sig-
nificantly associated (p< 0.05) with eigenvector centrality.
To answer the questions about the relationships among the
network centrality metrics, the results suggest that patient’s
degree centrality explains 90.2% of the variation in patient’s
closeness centrality, while 14% and 9.3% of the variation in
closeness centrality were explained by eigenvector and be-
tweenness centrality, respectively.
Furthermore, we investigated whether super-spreading
patients with high network centrality metrics (e.g., degree,
betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and 2-reach) have
similar attributes. Significant differences were observed in
age, gender, healthcare worker, and fatal cases across the
regions; however, no difference was observed in the pro-
portion of patients with comorbidities.
4. Discussion
In this study, several network centrality metrics (degree,
betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and 2-reach) were used
to quantify the connectivity among MERS cases and to
identify which patient requires prioritization for in-
tervention. Usually the patient with the highest degree has
the most ties to other patients in the network [9]. Saudi
Arabia is said to be facing continuous risk of MERS out-
breaks [26]. -e findings emphasize the importance of
patient’s level characteristics in understanding their level of
infectiousness. Results show that healthcare facilities and
healthcare workers are the most crucial factors in driving
national epidemics of MERS. Although healthcare workers
are at higher risk ofMERS infection due to their proximity to
infected patients, previous studies have shown that cases
among healthcare workers are less serious [27] with few
fatalities [28, 29].
Hospital infections display higher interconnectivity and,
on average, are linked to patients that are more connected to
highly connected patients than nonhospital infections. Re-
cent studies have reported the outbreaks of MERS in hos-
pitals [5, 30–33]. -e overcrowding in hospitals due to easy
access to medical care caused MERS to move quickly
throughout Korea [5]. Virtually, all cases of MERS in Korea
occurred in a hospital-to-hospital type of transmission [5].
Similarly, healthcare workers are more connected to
important nodes themselves than nonhealthcare workers.
Table 2: Summary of contact network metrics for the top 10 scores of MERS-CoV KSA during the study period (node (score)).
Score rank Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector 2-reach
1 1664 (17) 1522 (9) 1664 (0.004) 1664 (1) 1664 (0.068)
2 1025 (6) 1521 (8) 1672 (0.004) 1673 (0.243) 1672 (0.068)
3 124 (5) 897 (7) 1673 (0.004) 1690 (0.243) 1673 (0.068)
4 133 (5) 895 (6) 1674 (0.004) 1693 (0.243) 1674 (0.068)
5 897 (5) 910 (6) 1681 (0.004) 1674 (0.243) 1681 (0.068)
6 898 (4) 1025 (5) 1682 (0.004) 1682 (0.243) 1682 (0.068)
7 1522 (4) 1519 (5) 1683 (0.004) 1687 (0.243) 1683 (0.068)
8 18 (3) 133 (4) 1684 (0.004) 1689 (0.243) 1684 (0.068)
9 98 (3) 996 (2) 1685 (0.004) 1691 (0.243) 1685 (0.068)
10 213 (3) 1008 (2) 1686 (0.004) 1696 (0.243) 1686 (0.068)
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High connectivity among healthcare workers and their
proximity to MERS cases is not surprising because of the
nature of their job. In general, healthcare workers across
Saudi Arabia have negative attitude toward MERS infection
[34, 35]. Although infectious disease epidemiological plans
were put in place in some hospitals, outbreaks of MERS still
occurred due to the failure to adhere to the infection control
measures [33]. A high proportion of healthcare workers felt
at risk of contracting the disease but obliged to care for
MERS patients [33, 34]. Similarly, a high percentage of
healthcare workers do not feel safe at work using standard
precautions [34].
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Figure 5: Network contact structure for the spread of MERS-CoV infection in the KSA between 2012 and 2016 for top 10 in©uential nodes
based on degree and betweenness centrality in Table 2. Larger sized nodes implies (a) degree centrality and (b) betweenness centrality. 
e
circle nodes are females while square nodes are males.
e node colours represent contact history: pink is the index patient, green is hospital
linked, blue is community or family linked, red denotes the primary contact, and white nodes represent unknown contact history.
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In terms of the number of connected contacts (via degree
centrality), nodes 1664, 1025, 124, 133, and 897 were the top
5 most active MERS cases, but they do not reflect the spread
of MERS. -e most influential node is patient 1664 based on
degree centrality. Most of the secondary cases connected to
patient 1664 were either attended to by the same healthcare
worker(s) or are themselves healthcare workers that atten-
ded to patient 1664. Patients who are strongly tied in
a network are more likely to be similar to each other than
different. Patient 1664 was a 47-year-old female admitted to
the hospital with unrelated symptoms [36], and she was
associated with 14 healthcare worker cases and 3 household
cases because many healthcare staff treated her at the initial
stage during her hospitalization in a vascular surgery ward
and initially in an open ward, stressing the importance of
limiting access to other patients and quarantines.
Regarding infectivity, when determining the strength of
a patient in a network through not only its connectivity but
also the interconnectivity of its secondary cases, the be-
tweenness metric provides better estimate. -e low be-
tweenness score of patient 1664 indicates that while patient
1664 connects many other patients, it is not a pathway to
further infection. Nodes 1522, 1521, 897, 895, and 910 were
identified as critical in the spread of MERS to other cases
using the betweenness metric. -ese patients acted as
a bridge connecting other smaller secondary cases and thus
the spread of MERS infection by further connecting with
other secondary cases who also connect other important
cases. It was found that the individuals who connect 2 or
more separate contacts have an increased likelihood to
connect to multiple contacts [37]. Patient 1522 is a 26-year-
old female with no comorbidities was linked to three sec-
ondary cases and five other indirect offspring.
-e major limitation in this study lies in the data sources
and contact tracing accuracy. -e analysis is based on ret-
rospective data rather than prospective data collected from
multiple sources which are publicly available. -e accuracy
of some of the information provided by the patient may not
be verifiable especially during the early outbreaks; however,
the reporting has been improved upon over the years with
coordination between Saudi Ministry of Health and regional
WHO office. Similarly, while it is acknowledged that most
reported clusters occurred in the hospital as a result of
contact tracing, this is not surprising because of adequate
monitoring and data collection in the hospital that revealed
large secondary cases in the healthcare facilities. Lastly, as in
the case of publicly available data, these study data are
characterized by missing data. While the problems associ-
ated with inference-drawn, publicly available epidemiolog-
ical data are acknowledged, the results are meaningful and
suggest that structure and characteristics of contact network
can indeed have significant effect on the rate of transmission
of MERS disease.
5. Conclusions
-e present study highlighted the importance of contact
network in the spread of infectious disease. -ese results
provide interesting findings. -ey show that real-time
network analysis can provide insight into the structure of
transmission of infectivity to identify important players for
isolation and selective treatment. Moreover, the results
present rational estimate of the size of outbreak and the
underlying structural characteristics of the group [37]. Pa-
tients with high degree of centrality played a powerful role as
epidemic attenuators. Patients with high degree of centrality
played a powerful role as epidemic attenuators as they are
linked to many secondary cases that did not produce any
further secondary cases of their own. While patients with
high betweenness are epidemic amplifiers, they are a path-
way to infect other patients. -is study has shown that most
important nodes are those within the hospital, and
healthcare workers are more prone to the infection. Path-
ogenic droplets are easily transmitted within the confined
areas of hospitals, and control efforts should be put in place
at different layers of hospitals. Reducing contact formation
especially within the hospital by restricting hospital visita-
tion for MERS patient families and reducing the number of
healthcare workers with access to MERS patients will cer-
tainly have significant effect on the spread of MERS disease.
Saudi Arabia is said to be facing continuous risk of MERS
outbreaks [26]. If control measures are not put in place to
curtail the number of hospital visitors and movements of
nonessential staff within healthcare facility, with their
connectivity to people within the community, the disease
will speed up further national/international outbreaks. Fu-
ture research should focus on epidemiological analysis ex-
ploring the role of a healthcare facility in the spread MERS
disease.
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